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Environmental Inequity:
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Thomas Lambert and Christopher Boerner t
Eliminating "environmental racism" has become one of the premier civil
rights and environmental issues of the 1990s. Relying on a handful of studies
that purport to show patterns of discrimination against minorities and the
poor in the siting of industrial activity, federal and state policymakers have
attempted to limit further industrial siting in these areas. These
"environmental justice" initiatives appear to be premature, however, in light
of the substantial problems in current data documenting the prevalence of
discrimination. The article examines one such shortcoming: namely, that ex-
isting research fails to account for the dynamic nature of the housing market.
Analyzing data from the St. Louis metropolitan area, this study finds that
economic factors-not siting discrimination--are behind many claims of
environmental racism. This phenomenon suggests the need to develop public
policies that fit the economic nature of the problem. In particular, a policy
that compensates individuals living near industrial sites is the key to secur-
ing environmental justice.
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Introduction
Combining the ethical concerns of the civil rights movement with envi-
ronmentalism's sense of urgency, the environmental justice movement has
emerged as a major force shaping contemporary environmental policy. Advo-
cates of environmental justice, or environmental equity as it is sometimes
called, assert that discrimination in the siting and permitting of industrial and
waste facilities has forced minorities and the poor to bear disproportionately
the ill effects of pollution. Furthermore, these advocates contend that the dis-
criminatory application of environmental regulations and remediation proce-
dures has essentially let polluters in minority communities off the hook.
The claims of environmental justice advocates have not fallen on deaf
ears. All three branches of the federal government have taken steps to elimi-
nate environmental racism. In February 1994, the Clinton administration is-
sued an executive order on environmental equity, requiring each federal
agency to "make achieving environmental justice part of its mission."1 To
comply with the order, agencies must issue detailed reports outlining how
they plan to eliminate racially disparate environmental effects.
In the judiciary, federal judges are pursuing environmental justice by ap-
plying Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VI, which prohibits agen-
cies receiving federal funding from taking actions that disproportionately im-
pact minorities, allows plaintiffs to prove discrimination without establishing
discriminatory intent.2 While this provision has not traditionally been used in
the environmental arena, in the last year and a half over twenty Title VI suits
were filed against various permitting agencies. 3 Naturally, the threat of such
suits has strongly discouraged siting and permitting authorities from allowing
industrial facilities to operate in minority areas.
In Congress, activity has focused more directly on limiting where indus-
trial activity is concentrated. Over the last three years, Congress has consid-
ered a number of environmental justice bills, including the Environmental
Justice Act of 1992,4 the Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993,5 and the
Public Health Equity Act.6 All of these bills contained provisions that would
prohibit or strongly discourage industries from operating in certain low-
1. Executive Order Outlining Policy on Environmental Justice Issued February 11, 1994 (Text),
Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA), at 29 (Feb. 11, 1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1994). For a discussion of the use of Title VI, see Richard J.
Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993).
3. Civil Rights Complaint Filed With EPA Says California Dump Siting Is Racist, Cal. Env't
Daily (BNA) 15 (Dec. 20, 1994).
4. H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
5. H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
6. S. 1841, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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income and minority communities. 7 Recently, Congress also considered an
Environmental Risk Evaluation Act.8 Had this proposal been enacted, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would have been required to factor
environmental justice considerations into its assessment of environmental
risk.
Besides the three branches of the federal government, many states are
taking steps to combat alleged environmental racism. Various state houses are
considering, or have recently considered, at least fifteen different environ-
mental justice bills.9
Clearly, in terms of gaining legislative and regulatory attention, the envi-
ronmental justice movement has been extraordinarily successful. In a short
amount of time, what started as a small grassroots movement has blossomed
into a powerful national force, influencing many high-level environmental
decisions. In spite of this success, however, the movement faces lingering
difficulties. There are substantial holes in the data documenting the extent of
environmental racism. These research omissions are leading to policy pro-
posals that are unlikely to alleviate environmental disparity in the long run.
This Article examines a primary shortcoming of many environmental
justice studies that have been done to date: namely, that they do not account
for the dynamic nature of housing markets. Employing an original analysis of
data from the St. Louis metropolitan area to separate out the possible causes
of environmental disparities, this Article concludes that, to the degree that
environmental disparities exist, it is economic factors-not siting discrimina-
tion-that are behind many claims of environmental racism. Industrial facili-
ties that were originally sited in white areas often become surrounded by mi-
nority residents who are attracted to these neighborhoods by falling housing
prices. This phenomenon suggests the need to develop public policies that fit
the economic nature of the problem. In particular, a policy that facilitates
compensation of individuals residing in communities accepting industrial and
waste facilities is the key to securing environmental justice. Such an approach
addresses the economic factors that create and exacerbate environmental dis-
parities, promotes justice and efficiency, and offers valuable benefits to im-
poverished communities.
This Article does not address possible bias on the part of regulating
authorities given the responsibility of enforcing environmental protection
laws or administering environmental clean-up programs. It instead focuses
exclusively on charges of bias in private and public sector siting of pollution
sources.
7. For a detailed discussion of these bills, see CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS LAMBERT,
ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE? (1994).
8. S. 123, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See also Moynihan Bill Would Add Equity Concerns to
Risk, Cost Evaluations of Programs, Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 10, 1995).
9. For a survey of state environmental justice legislation, see BARTON HACKER, ENvIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LEGISLATION IN THE STATES (1994).
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Existing Research on Environmental Racism. The claim that minorities
and the poor face discrimination in the environmental arena is not a novel
one. For over two decades, small grassroots organizations such as the Mothers
of East Los Angeles and Chicago's People for Community Recovery have
highlighted what they consider to be systematic discrimination in the siting,
regulation, and remediation of industrial and waste facilities.
10
Detailed empirical analysis of these claims, however, has been limited.
While a recent literature survey by the National Wildlife Federation reports to
have found sixty-three studies documenting environmental discrimination,"
the vast majority of these studies are either very limited in scope or suffer
from profound methodological difficulties. Indeed, only a handful of major
studies specifically address the environmental justice issue.
The first such study was published in 1983 by the sociologist Robert D.
Bullard, who was at that time on the faculty of the University of California at
Riverside. 12 Examining population data for areas surrounding landfills and
incinerators in Houston, Texas, Dr. Bullard found that the vast majority of the
city's landfills and incinerators was located in disproportionately black com-
munities. From this finding, Dr. Bullard deduced that environmental racism
had made Houston's African-American neighborhoods the "dumping grounds
for the city's household garbage."
In 1983, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative
arm of Congress, provided the second widely discussed study documenting
environmental disparity.13 Examining data from four commercial hazardous
waste facilities in the Southeast, the GAO found that the populations in three
of the four surrounding areas were primarily African-American. The study
also found the facilities to be in disproportionately poor areas.
The most widely cited environmental equity study, Toxic Wastes and
Race in the United States, was published in 1987 by the Commission for Ra-
cial Justice of the United Church of Christ (CRJ). Using population data from
ZIP codes as well as information gathered from the EPA and other sources,
the CRJ discovered a positive correlation between the number of commercial
waste facilities in a ZIP code area and the percentage of minority residents in
that area. In August 1994, the CRJ released Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited,
an update of its earlier study. This update, which employed the same meth-
odology as before, claimed to uncover "even greater racial disparities in the
placement of toxic waste sites, despite increased attention to the issue of envi-
10. For an overview of grassroots environment organizations and their activities, see Norris
McDonald, Grass-Roots Groundswell: An Introduction, 175N-92-001 EPA J. 45 (1992); Dorceta Tay-
lor, The Environmental Justice Movement, 175N-92-001 EPA J. 23 (1992).
11. BENJAMIN GOLDMAN, NOT JUST PROSPERITY: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABIL1TY WITH ENvi-
RONMENTAL JUSTICE (1993).
12. Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC. INQUIRY
273 (1983).
13. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
Vol. 14:195, 1997
Environmental Inequity
ronmental justice as evidenced by an Executive Order from President Clinton
on this issue.,
1 4
The above studies purporting to provide evidence of environmental dis-
crimination did not go entirely unchallenged. In 1994, the Social and Demo-
graphic Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts (UMass) pub-
lished a study that found no statistical difference between the percentage of
minorities living in neighborhoods with commercial hazardous waste facili-
ties and the percentage of minorities in areas without such facilities. 15 The
UMass study is unique in that it was the first national study of environmental
justice that did not rely on ZIP codes (or larger geographic units) as the pri-
mary unit of analysis. Because ZIP codes are often quite large, they can mask
demographic differences among smaller areas located within the same ZIP
code (e.g., a large, rural ZIP code may be predominately white over all, while
the population of one comer of the ZIP code is overwhelmingly nonwhite). In
order to account for this possibility, UMass researchers repeated the CRJ
study using data from census tracts-geographic units that are smaller than
ZIP codes and hence less likely to mask demographic subtleties. The results
of the UMass study, however, have been largely ignored in policy discus-
sions. One likely explanation for the study's lack of influence is its primary
funding source. The UMass study was funded by a grant from WMX Tech-
nologies, the nation's largest waste hauler; it is possible that this funding
source raised suspicions that the study's numbers were warped by corporate
influence.
The studies discussed above, with the exception of the uMass study,
provide most of the available empirical evidence on the extent of environ-
mental racism in the United States.' 6 It is thus remarkable that such a limited
14. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE
REvisrrED 1 (1994). For a response to this study, see Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boemer, Dis-
crimination is Effect, Not Cause, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Sept. 1, 1994, at B 11.
15. Douglas Anderton et al., Hazardous Waste Facilities: "Environmental Equity" Issues in
Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REv. 123 (1994).
16. In addition, evidence of alleged environmental racism has been buttressed by at least one other
study focusing not on siting statistics, but rather on racial disparities in EPA enforcement and remediation
procedures. Authored by Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle in 1992, this study purportedly found that
the EPA levies smaller fines and takes longer to clean up waste sites in minority communities than in
white areas. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
There are, however, two very substantial difficulties with Lavelle and Coyle's study. First of all, the
authors define "minority community" too broadly. Some "minority" communities in the study have a
higher percentage of white residents than the nation as a whole. The study, for example, considers Staten
Island a minority community, stating that "small fines in minority areas have been lodged against indus-
trial giants: a $22,000 air pollution penalty against Proctor and Gamble Co. in Staten Island, N.Y." Id. at
S6. Staten Island, however, is 85% white. It is, in fact, the "whitest" of New York's five boroughs. To
call the area a minority community seems absurd.
Secondly, Lavelle and Coyle ignore alternate explanations besides discrimination for disparities in
fines. According to EPA Administrator Carol Browner, 'When [the EPA] fime[s] companies, when we
penalize them for violating environmental laws, we do take into account ability to pay the fine, because
not only do we want a fine paid but we want a corrective action taken. We want the pollution cleaned up.
And so it is a comprehensive analysis that we are undertaking to ensure that we don't, in fact, have lower
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body of knowledge has fueled the policy whirlwind highlighted in the intro-
duction. More importantly, this scant body of knowledge has elevated envi-
ronmental racism from the status of hypothesis to that of fact. The ethos em-
braced by officials responsible for environmental regulation is clear:
environmental racism unequivocally exists. "Nobody can question," claimed
EPA administrator Carol Browner in a press briefing two years ago, "that, for
far too long, communities across the country-low income, minority com-
munities-have been asked to bear a disproportionate share of our modem
industrial life."' 1
7
The Economic Causes of Environmental Inequity. All of the studies de-
scribed above share a common flaw. Professor Bullard's study, the GAO re-
port, and both CRJ studies all examined current racial and demographic data
around polluting and waste plants. Environmental justice advocates have
pointed to the findings of these studies as evidence of discrimination in siting
and permitting. 18 Their reasoning seems to be that because polluting and
waste facilities are disproportionately located in minority areas, the plants
must have been sited in a discriminatory fashion.
The causal explanation for the problem of environmental inequity is more
complex, however. Even if a disproportionate percentage of industrial plants
are currently located in minority areas (a contention the UMass study ques-
tions), this does not imply that these facilities were sited in a discriminatory
fashion. To determine whether or not the plants were sited proportionately,
one would need to consider the demographic and racial conditions of their
host communities at the time the facilities were built.
It is of course not unusual for demographic conditions around industrial
plants to change over time. Facilities originally sited in white areas may
eventually become surrounded by minority residents. Those who reason that a
disproportionate percentage of minorities and poor people around industrial
plants indicates discriminatory siting ignore alternate explanations besides
racism for any currently observed disparity.
Many environmental justice advocates insist that the issue of alternative
explanations for environmental inequity is inconsequential. In a recent issue
of Environment magazine, for instance, Professor Robert Bullard criticized an
article we wrote on this issue suggesting that the dynamics of the housing
market, rather than racism or discrimination, may be behind current environ-
penalties being applied in certain communities. But it's not as simple as just looking at the dollar amount
that may have been applied in a particular event." White House Briefing on Environmental Justice, Feb.
11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Archives File.
Seeking to explore alternate explanations for disparities in fines, the authors of this paper requested
the data set upon which the National Law Journal findings were based. We were told, however, that the
data would not be released because the findings were "too controversial."
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Paul Moha & Bunyan Bryant, Demographic Studies Reveal a Pattern of Environ-
mental Injustice, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 10 (Jonathan S. Petrikin ed.,1995); Robert D. Bullard,
Overcoming Racism in Environmental Decisionmaking, 36 ENV'T 4, 11 (1994).
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mental disparity. According to Professor Bullard, "Thomas Lambert and
Christopher Boerner are engaged in a senseless 'chicken-or-egg' debate-the
question of which came first, the community or the waste facilities. The de-
bate is a distraction from the real task of ending environmental injustice
wherever and whenever it occurs."'
19
It is impossible, however, to "end environmental injustice wherever and
whenever it occurs" without considering what factors are motivating envi-
ronmental disparity. Rather than being a distraction, an examination of
"which came first" is vitally important to creating a long-term policy solution.
A static analysis of environmental equity concerns simply does not provide
sufficient information to develop workable solutions and may often mistake
disparities for discrimination. In fact, the shortcomings of a static analysis
were nicely illustrated by Professor Vicki Been in a 1994 Yale Law Journal
article.20 Looking at the GAO study and Robert Bullard's account of envi-
ronmental racism in Houston, both of which failed to factor in data from the
time of industrial sitings, Professor Been attempted to refine these analyses by
gathering demographic data on the census tracts including and surrounding
the relevant facilities from the time the plants were constructed.
Professor Been's extension of the Bullard study reveals that discrimina-
tory siting may not lie behind many instances of current environmental dis-
parity. Considering the racial composition of areas around Houston's landfills
and incinerators at the time the facilities were built, Professor Been found that
five of Houston's ten landfills and incinerators were originally located in ar-
eas with lower percentages of minority residents than Harris County (the ju-
risdiction covering Houston). The other five facilities were built in areas with
above-average percentages of nonwhite residents.2'
Over time, however, demographic changes occurred around the plants.
Minority percentages increased around all the facilities initially located in
predominantly white areas, so that by 1990, nine out of the ten landfills and
incinerators were located in neighborhoods with above average percentages of
minority residents. 22 Professor Been found similar market dynamics to be at
work with respect to poverty. At the time they were built, only three of the ten
waste plants were located in neighborhoods with substantially higher than av-
erage poverty rates. By 1990, however, seven of the ten facilities were found
to be in neighborhoods with disproportionately high poverty rates.
23
On the other hand, Professor Been's analysis of the GAO study failed to
show demographic trends similar to those in her extension of the Bullard
study. Though the GAO study looked only at four sites, a rather small sample
19. Bullard, supra note 18, at 3.
20. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate
Siting or Market Dynamics? 103 YALE L. J. 1383, 1398 (1994).
21. Id. at 1403.
22. Id. at 1411 (tbl. 5).
23. Id. at 1412 (tbl. 6).
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from which to draw significant conclusions, Professor Been's analysis
showed that the neighborhoods surrounding these four sites did have higher
percentages of minority residents at the time of siting than the overall average
for the state in which they were located. 24
The demographic changes noted in Professor Been's analysis of Houston
industrial sites may be understood as instances of "white flight," a demo-
graphic phenomenon that can be explained in terms of the dynamics of the
housing market. Every year, between 17 and 20% of Americans move to a
new home. 25 A primary reason for relocating is dissatisfaction with one's cur-
rent living conditions. After an industrial or waste facility moves into a
neighborhood, the surrounding area is commonly perceived to be less desir-
able, and real estate prices fall accordingly. Indeed, the UMass study found
that the average value of homes in census tracts with commercial hazardous
waste facilities was approximately $11,000 less than the value of homes in
other census tracts ($47,000 versus $58,000).26 Over time, the attractiveness
of cheap housing draws lower-income homeowners and renters. A racially
skewed income distribution, some degree of lingering housing discrimination,
and people's tendency to locate near others who are "like themselves" often
cause these areas to have a larger share of nonwhite residents.27
Moreover, industrial siting tends to beget further industrial siting. As
plant construction causes real estate prices in a community to fall, the area
becomes more attractive to other businesses seeking to build industrial facili-
ties. The construction of these plants may cause the neighborhood to be per-
ceived as an even less desirable place to live, and real estate prices may fall
further, attracting more low-income residents and additional polluting facili-
ties. 2
8
Professor Been's study effectively drew attention to the role market dy-
namics play in creating environmental disparity.29 Her analysis, which was
24. Id. at 1400.
25. Id. at 1388.
26. Anderton et al., supra note 15, at tbl. 1.
27. For evidence of race differences in income distribution, see James P. Smith & Finis Welch,
Race Differences in Earnings: A Survey and New Evidence, in CURRENT IssuEs IN URBAN ECONOMICS
40 (Peter Mieszkowski & Mahlon Straszheim eds., 1979). For a discussion of discrimination in the hous-
ing market, see John Yinger, Prejudice and Discrimination in the Urban Housing Market, in CURRENT
IssuEs IN URBAN ECONOMics 430 (Peter Mieszkowski & Mahlon Straszheim eds., 1979). For evidence
that an individual's decisions to relocate and their choice of neighborhoods is influenced by a desire to be
near others who are "like themselves," see WILLIAM M. DOBRINER, CLAss IN SUBURBIA 64 (1963).
28. For a discussion of the local impact of industrial siting, see Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got
to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L.
REv. 1001 (1993).
29. University of Chicago Professor Donald Coursey found similar trends in a study of CERCLA
sites in the city of Chicago. At the time of siting, most of Chicago's industrial activity was concentrated in
census tracts that were not densely populated and had relatively few, if any, minority residents. As the
years progressed, however, concentrations of minority residents living in close proximity to hazardous
waste sites increased noticeably. See DONALD COURSEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM IN THE CrrY OF
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limited to ten sites in the Houston area, pointed to a need for more extensive
research of "white flight" in other metropolitan areas. Been's study motivated
us to conduct a more comprehensive study examining the extent and possible
causes of environmental disparity in the St. Louis metropolitan area.
I. Statistical Analysis of Environmental Inequity in St. Louis
Unlike Professor Been's examination, which was limited to Houston's
landfills and incinerators, the following analysis of St. Louis, Missouri con-
siders demographic characteristics around several different types of industrial
facilities and waste sites.30 The facilities examined include three types of
pollution sources: permitted commercial and noncommercial hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs), which include active in-
dustrial plants that handle hazardous waste; permitted solid waste landfills
and incinerators; and inactive hazardous waste sites (those regulated by the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act 31 --often referred to as CERCLA or "Superfund" sites). Geographically,
the St. Louis area is taken to include the city of St. Louis and St. Louis
County in Missouri, as well as St. Clair and Madison Counties in Illinois. In
total, we examined 167 industrial facilities and waste sites, including 73 ac-
tive facilities and 94 inactive waste sites.
A. The Evidence of Environmental Disparity
Our statistical analysis found no significant difference in poverty rates
and percentages of minority residents between census tracts with active fa-
cilities (TSDFs, landfills, and incinerators) and those tracts without such fa-
cilities.32 Including inactive CERCLA waste sites in the data set, however,
CHICAGO: THE HISTORY OF EPA HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS
(1994).
30. CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS LAMBERT, ENviRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE CITY OF ST.
LOUIS: THE ECONOMICS OF SITING INDUSTRIAL AND WASTE FACILITIES (Center for the Study of Ameri-
can Business,Working Paper No. 156, 1995).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.
32. BOERNER AND LAMBERT, supra note 30, at 10-14. The statistical analysis identified six vari-
ables that provide useful information about the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of census
tracts: Median housing values (MDHV), the percentage of male residents employed in the labor force
(WORK), the percentage of residents below the poverty line (POV), the percentage of nonwhite residents
(MINOR), the percentage of residents with a high school education or higher (PCTEDU), and the per-
centage of residents employed in manufacturing (PCTMANF). While this subset of variables is far from
perfect, it does allow us to glean important information about the racial, ethnic, and industrial composi-
tion of census tracts. In addition, we created a dummy variable for whether or not a facility was located in
a given tract (PLANT). This variable was coded either 0 (no facility present) or I (facility present).
We began our analysis by examining how census tracts with polluting facilities differed from those
without facilities in 1970, 1980, and 1990-the three years for which socioeconomic and demographic
information was readily available. Using these seven variables, we ran two statistical tests: the t-test for a
difference of means, and a two-sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for the equality of distributions. Both
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uncovered weak evidence that the percentages of poor and minority residents
living near industrial and waste sites are significantly higher than the corre-
sponding percentages living in tracts without facilities. 33 It would therefore
seem that proponents of environmental discrimination theories could, upon a
first glance, find evidence to support their theories in our St. Louis study.
Such a conclusion, however, would be a premature one. This difference
may be partly or even entirely attributable to factors unrelated to discrimina-
tory siting of facilities. For instance, the median housing values of tracts
hosting polluting facilities are significantly lower than housing values in
tracts without plants.34 It is only when significant disparities in housing val-
ues arise that differences in the percentages of poor and minority residents
become noticeable. 35 This finding provides empirical support for the theory
that housing values are closely related to existing environmental inequities,
raising the possibility that siting decisions caused an influx of minority and
poor residents, as opposed to the contrary causation assumptions made by
environmental discrimination theorists.
tests were used to test the null hypothesis that the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of cen-
sus tracts with facilities are essentially the same as those without facilities.
Tables Ia, lb, and Ic, infra, provide the results of these tests when TSDFs, landfills, and incinera-
tors are examined. In each of the three years analyzed, the percentage of minority residents in census
tracts containing polluting facilities is approximately the same as in tracts without such facilities (see T-
scores and Wilcoxon Z-statistic in tables la, lb, and 1c). Similarly, our tests found no significant differ-
ence in poverty rates between census tracts with and without TSDFs. These two conclusions are suffi-
cient to raise serious questions about environmental justice advocates' claims of disproportionate im-
pact-at least with respect to TSDFs in the St. Louis area.
The most consistent result of tables la, lb and Ic concerns the occupation of residents surrounding
St. Louis TSDFs. While no clear differences were found in employment rates, the percentage of residents
employed in manufacturing was found to be significantly higher in census tracts with TSDFs than in other
tracts for one or both of the tests in each of the years examined. This should not be surprising given that
many TSDFs are located in industrial areas where a larger percentage of residents would naturally be
employed in manufacturing. This result is consistent with the TSDF research conducted by the University
of Massachusetts in 1994.
33. Id. at 11-14. The addition of CERCLA sites to the data set changed our results noticeably.
See Tables 2a, 2b & 2c, infra. First, the percentage of residents employed in manufacturing is no longer
significantly larger for tracts with facilities than for other census tracts. This makes sense given that Su-
perfund sites are inactive and, hence, not employing workers. Second, there is weak evidence that the
percentages of poor and minority residents living near polluting facilities are significantly larger than the
percentages of such individuals living in tracts without such facilities. (The Wilcoxon Z-statistic for the
percentage of minority residents is significant at the 5% level in 1970 and 1980 and at the 10% level in
1990. Similarly, the Z-statistic for poverty is significant at the 5% level in 1980 and at the 10% level in
1970 and 1990.) There is also very weak evidence that the residents of census tracts with CERCLA fa-
cilities, TSDFs, landfills, and incinerators are somewhat less educated than the residents of other tracts.
34. See Tables 2a, 2b & 2c, infra. The median housing values of tracts hosting polluting facilities
are significantly lower than tracts without plants for each of the three years examined. (The Z-statistic is
significant at the 1% level for 1970 and 1980, and at the 5% level in 1990).
35. See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 30, at 15. These results may also suggest that indus-
trial facilities tend to be sited in neighborhoods where property values are quite low. Naturally, industry
executives will be expected to minimize costs by locating where property values are low.
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B. The Evidence of "White Flight"
1. Racial Dynamics Around Active Facilities
In order to test the possibility that the housing market prompts poor and
minority individuals to move into industrial areas, we examined how the ra-
cial characteristics of communities containing active industrial and waste
facilities changed over time. We were able to identify the start-up dates for 68
of the 73 locatable TSDFs, landfills, and incinerators in the area.36 Historical
census data were available for the areas surrounding sixty-two of these sixty-
eight plants.37 An examination of the racial characteristics of these tracts from
the census taken closest to the time the facilities were built revealed that only
fourteen of these sixty-two facilities (23%) were initially sited in census tracts
with greater minority percentages than that of the overall St. Louis area.38
Thus, close to 80% of active facilities in St. Louis were originally sited in
census tracts that were either uninhabited or contained higher than average
percentages of nonminority (white) residents.
Unlike Vicki Been's Houston study, this analysis did not find that the
majority of the host communities subsequently developed higher than average
minority concentrations. By 1990, still only seventeen of the St. Louis area
sites (27%) were in census tracts with higher-than-average percentages of
nonwhite residents. 39 Nevertheless, percentages of minority residents did in-
crease at a disproportionate rate around hazardous waste TSDFs, landfills,
and incinerators. Census data were available for fifty active facilities that
were constructed prior to 1985. Between the time they were built and 1990,
minority percentages around 84% of these facilities (fourty-two out of fifty)
grew at a substantially faster rate than did the minority percentage in the
overall area.40 In other words, "white flight" occurred more quickly around
the vast majority of TSDFs, landfills, and incinerators than it did in the
overall St. Louis area.
36. This information was obtained by phoning the owner of each facility and requesting a contact
with access to records of the date that the facility opened for operation. In many cases, multiple owners
had to be contacted before records with this information could be obtained. Also, we compared the ad-
dress from the owner's records and our records to ensure that we were obtaining the startup date for the
appropriate facility.
37. Census information is, of course, only available for areas that are designated into census tracts
or "tracted." Six of the sixty-eight facilities were in areas that were not tracted near the time of siting. For
the thirteen facilities sited before 1935, the 1930 census (the first census broken into tracts) was used to
determine community demographics at the time of siting. Several of these plants were sited significantly
earlier than 1930, but the 1930 information is the earliest available data.
38 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 30, at 16.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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2. Demographic Changes Around All Sites (1970-1990)
In most cases, it was impossible to determine start-up dates for inactive
hazardous waste (CERCLA) sites. It was, therefore, impossible to trace
demographic changes around those sites from the time they came to exist.
This analysis does, however, trace changes in residential patterns around
those sites from 1970 to 1990. We assume that St. Louis area CERCLA sites
were established prior to 1970, and can therefore be safely included in this
analysis. Virtually all of the EPA's descriptions that were available for these
sites referenced operations that were taking place prior to 1970. Thus, even
though precise start-up dates for St. Louis area CERCLA sites were not avail-
able, they are included in this analysis of changing residential patterns from
1970 forward.
Moreover, changes in residential patterns around industrial and waste
facilities are likely to have been more pronounced after 1970 because public
perception of pollution as unhealthy and undesirable dramatically increased
during this time.4t Prior to these years, pollution was seen as a nuisance, but
not necessarily as a significant health risk. Hence, one would expect the ef-
fects of pollution on land values and residential patterns to be most noticeable
beginning in the early 1970s.
This is not to say that the presence of pollution did not motivate demo-
graphic changes around these facilities prior to 1970. Many CERCLA sites
(as well as active facilities) in place before 1970 may have been viewed as
nuisances by their neighbors and may have motivated demographic trends
such as falling housing values, "white flight," and increasing concentrations
of poor residents. Indeed, higher percentages of minority residents and im-
poverished families, as well as lower family incomes and housing values,
around facilities in 1970 may indicate that the presence of industrial and
waste sites had already led to demographic transitions in those areas.42 Never-
theless, because public perception of pollution's risks greatly expanded in the
1960s and early 1970s, one would expect to see the greatest demographic
changes occurring after the 1970 census.
The findings of this analysis support the theory that environmental dis-
parities are exacerbated as minority and poor individuals voluntarily move
into areas surrounding industrial and waste sites. Between 1970 and 1990,
concentrations of poor and minority individuals increased disproportionately
around the St. Louis area's CERCLA sites, TSDFs, and nonhazardous land-
41. Many events occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s increasing the public's concern about the
negative effects of pollution. For a discussion of the rise of the environmental movement during this pe-
riod, see NORMAN J. VIG & MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENViRONmENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 11-13 (1990).
42. Such data could also, of course, indicate that the facilities were sited disproportionately in
lower income, minority areas. The purpose of examining trends from 1970 to 1990 is to compare rates of
demographic changes around facilities with those for the overall area, to determine which of these expla-
nations is more likely.
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fills and incinerators. Furthermore, mean real family incomes fell in these ar-
eas during the twenty-year period, and median real housing values increased
at a slower rate around these facilities.43 While the concentration of minority
residents in a given census tract in the overall St. Louis area increased, on av-
erage, by 29%, concentration of minority residents in tracts containing indus-
trial facilities increased by 67% (see Figure 1.) This evidence suggests that, in
this twenty-year period, minority individuals were disproportionately moving
to (or remaining in) areas surrounding industrial and waste sites.
Poverty rates similarly increased more quickly around industrial and
waste facilities. From 1970 to 1990, the average census tract in the St. Louis
area experienced a 10% net increase in its poverty rate, compared to a 53%
increase in tracts containing industrial and waste facilities (see Figure 2).
While St. Louis's mean family income rose 5.6%, in real terms, from 1970 to
1990, this figure actually fell 1.4% around industrial and waste sites (see Fig-
ure 3). Relative increases in poverty rates and decreases in family incomes
indicate that a higher percentage of low-income families were moving to (or
remaining in) these areas from 1970 to 1990.
43. Unlike family income, median housing values increased, in real terms, around St. Louis's in-
dustrial and waste sites-but the growth was slower than for St. Louis overall. Between 1970 and 1990,
the median real housing value for St. Louis overall grew 8.7 percent. However, average growth in the
median housing value around industrial and waste facilities was substantially slower. The average facility
in the St. Louis area was located in a census tract whose median real housing value grew only 3.9 percent
between 1970 and 1990 (see Figure 4). This finding supports the "market dynamics" theory which pre-
dicts that growth in housing values will be slower around industrial and waste facilities than in nonindus-
trial areas.
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Figure 1
Comparison of Minority Concentration Around Industrial and Waste
Sites to the Concentration in the St. Louis Area as a Whole, 1970-1990
* Average for all Census Tracts in St. Louis Area
* Weighted Average for Census Tracts Containing Industrial
or Waste Facilities (TSDFs, Landfills, Incinerators, and
CERCLA Sites)a
Source: Authors' calculations.
a. For each facility, the minority concentration for its host census tract is
entered. The sum of these figures is divided by the total number of facilities to















Comparison of Poverty Levels Around Industrial and Waste Sites to
Rates in the St. Louis Area as a Whole, 1970-1990
* Average for all Census Tracts in St. Louis Area
* Weighted Average for Census Tracts Containi





a. For each facility, the minority concentration for its host census tract is en-
tered. The sum of these figures is divided by the total number of facilities to
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Figure 3
Comparison of Mean Family Income (1990 Dollars) Around
Industrial and Waste Sites to Income in the St. Louis Area
as a Whole, 1970-1990
* Average for all Census Tracts in St. Louis Area
M Weighted Average for Census Tracts Containing Industrial or Waste
Facilities (TSDFs, Landfills, Incinerators, and CERCLA Sites)a
Source:Authors' calculations.
a. For each facility, the minority concentration for its host census tract is
entered. The sum of these figures is divided by the total number of facilities to




Comparison of the Median Housing Value (1990 Dollars) Around Indus-
trial and Waste Sites to the Value in the St. Louis Area as a Whole,
1970-1990
[ Average for all Census Tracts in St. Louis Area
" Weighted Average for Census Tracts Containing Industrial or
Waste Facilities (TSDFs, Landfills, Incinerators, and
CERCLA Sites)'
Source:Authors' calculations.
a. For each facility, the minority concentration for its host census tract is
entered. The sum of these figures is divided by the total number of facilities to
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It should be noted that the conclusions drawn from this study may pro-
vide an incomplete picture of the environmental justice issue in a number of
respects. First, this study looks at only one major metropolitan area.44 Re-
search in other cities and rural areas may provide valuable insight into other
factors that might contribute to existing environmental disparities. Second,
while there is no evidence that the owners of industrial facilities willfully
sited them in minority or poor neighborhoods, other forms of racial discrimi-
nation may have been a factor influencing the subsequent migration of these
residents to communities hosting polluting facilities. Future research should
attempt to identify the factors which influence demographic trends surround-
ing environmental nuisances. Finally, our statistical tests do not include a host
of factors which may affect a company's decision to site in a given area. Geo-
graphic factors such as zoning restrictions and access to transportation routes
are likely to be important in determining the location of industrial facilities.
Future work on environmental equity should also consider these issues, which
may allow the importance of race in siting decisions to be isolated with
greater precision. Even with these limitations, however, this study does pro-
vide substantial empirical support to the theory that existing inequities are
primarily caused by economics rather than siting discrimination, suggesting
that the environmental justice movement could be more effective by focusing
on these underlying economic causes.
I. Solutions
A. Proposed Environmental Justice Policies
The failure to propose concrete remedies for environmental inequities has
been the environmental justice movement's most obvious shortcoming. While
environmental justice advocates often suggest creating various offices,
councils, and task forces, they rarely detail how these entities should influ-
ence the pollution allocation process. 45 Instead, they primarily advance gen-
44. It should be noted, however, that St. Louis is an especially salient focus for an environmental
justice study such as this. The city is ranked among the most segregated cities in the United States. See
STATISTICAL RECORD OF BLACK AMERICA 376 (Carrell P. Horton & Jessie Carney Smith eds., 1990). As
such, to the extent that a statistically interesting correlation between race and proximity to polluting fa-
cilities exists anywhere, St. Louis would seem to be a likely candidate.
45. See, e.g., Environmental Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 5-6 (1993) (statement of Dr. Benjamin F.
Chavis, Jr., Executive Director, Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of Christ); id. at 56-62
(statement of Deeohn Ferris, Program Director, Environmental Justice Project, Lawyer's Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law). See also FIRST PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT,
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1991) (copy on file with authors). This lack of specific rec-
ommendations is also seen in the following description of the objectives of environmental justice from
Benjamin Goldman. According to Mr. Goldman, "Environmental justice requires proactive shifts in con-
sciousness, greater responsibility to and respect for diversity, and raising equity and fairness objectives to
a par with efficiency goals. A roundtable approach to decision-making is needed to ensure destructive
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eral concepts of equality, not wishing to endanger their coalition by specify-
ing the precise methods of achieving "justice," "fairness," or "equity."
So far, environmental justice policies have focused primarily on limiting
industrial siting in low-income and minority neighborhoods. The use of Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,46 for example, strongly discourages authori-
ties from allowing industrial and waste facilities to operate in minority areas.
Moreover, the threat of being involved in discrimination suits encourages
facility owners to build away from poor and minority neighborhoods.
Legislative proposals similarly seek to restrict where facilities may oper-
ate. The environmental justice bills mentioned in the introduction to this re-
port-the Environmental Justice Act, Environmental Equal Rights Act, Pub-
lic Health Equity Act, as well as many state proposals47 -would effectively
prohibit or discourage the operation of polluting and waste plants in minority
areas.
Under executive order to develop strategies for achieving environmental
justice, federal agencies have also focused on influencing where facilities op-
erate. Region I of the EPA (comprised of the New England states) recently
discouraged industrial and waste firms from operating in low-income and mi-
nority communities by committing to triple the number of environmental in-
spections in such areas. 48 Furthermore, the EPA's Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response called for the agency to "form a siting work-group to
evaluate location standards" and "develop a siting guidance document ... on
how to best site a hazardous waste facility in light of environmental justice
concerns." 49 While the agency did not specify how location and siting stan-
dards might change, it is likely that any evaluation of location standards and
development of guidelines for siting facilities "in light of environmental jus-
tice concerns" will have the effect of encouraging facility owners to operate
away from poor and minority areas.
The empirical evidence from the study of St. Louis suggests that these
environmental justice policies are misguided. To the extent that the dynamics
of the housing market lead minorities and the poor to move to the "nuisance",
policies that regulate where polluting and waste facilities may operate do not
provide lasting solutions. Forcing industrial development into wealthier white
disproportionate impacts do not occur. Workers, communities, and others who have been left out of de-
cisions about what goods and services corporations produce and how they are produced need to be
brought into such decision-making processes in the future if environmentally-sustainable and socially-just
economic activities are to happen." Goldman, supra note 11, at xxx. Mr. Goldman, like many other envi-
ronmental justice advocates, often speaks in generalities. Rarely, however does he specify the precise
public policies that will achieve "shifts in consciousness, greater responsibility to and respect for diversity,
and raising equity and fairness objectives to a par with efficiency goals." Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1994).
47. See supra notes 4-9.
48. Region I Plans to Increase Inspections for Low-Income, Minority Neighborhoods, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA), May 10, 1994.
49. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OSWER ENVIRoNMENTAL JUSTICE TASK FORCE DRAFT FINAL REPORT 43 (1994).
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areas may alleviate environmental disparity in the short run, but the trends
observed in Houston and St. Louis indicate that these communities will not
retain their racial and demographic characteristics. Eventually, real estate
prices around the facilities will likely fall or rise at a slower rate that in the
overall area, and concentrations of poor and minority residents will increase
around the plants.
B. A Compensation-Based Solution
1. Eliminates "White Flight"
A better long-term solution would focus on providing compensation to
those who live near locally undesirable facilities, so that, on balance, the sur-
rounding property is not rendered less desirable. The specific nature of these
offsetting benefits may vary and should remain in the purview of the potential
host community and the prospective developer. Some possible forms of com-
pensation include: (1) direct payments to affected landowners, (2) host fees
which are paid into a community's general revenue fund to be used to finance
a variety of public projects or to lower property taxes, (3) grants for improv-
ing local health-care delivery and education, and (4) the provision of parks
and other recreational amenities.
In some cases, developers can actually guarantee property values near
their sites, promising to reimburse residents whose land becomes less valu-
able after a facility moves in. Browning Ferris Industries (BFI), the nation's
second largest waste management company, frequently makes such a guaran-
tee.
50
Providing compensating benefits to the neighbors of industrial and waste
plants decreases the incentive for these members of the community to relo-
cate, thereby stabilizing property values around facilities. In this way, com-
pensation can eliminate much of the white flight that appears to underlie
many cases of alleged environmental racism.
2. Addresses Root Problem
Besides dealing with the practical problem of white flight, a compensa-
tion-based solution to environmental disparity, unlike proposals that focus on
restricting facility sitings, gets to the very heart of environmental injustice.
Ultimately, the environmental justice issue boils down to the question of who
should bear the costs of industrial processes.
Economists refer to pollution as an external cost or a negative externality:
negative because it is undesirable, and an externality because it affects those
50. Telephone Interview with William Ruckelshaus, Chief Executive Officer, Browning Ferris In-
dustries (Apr. 28, 1995).
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who are outside the process that creates it.51 Air and water pollution are both
examples of costs that are involuntarily borne by individuals outside the pro-
duction process. Likewise, industrial and hazardous waste facilities may im-
pose external costs on their neighbors in the form of unpleasant noise, foul
odors, increased traffic, or greater perceived health risk.
Many critics of compensation-based approaches insist that it is euphe-
mistic to refer to the health risks imposed by industrial facilities as negative
externalities or external costs. These individuals criticize the attempt to place
a dollar value on human safety and health.52 The classic economic response
explains that individuals implicitly perform such calculations all the time. For
instance, in exchange for pay, many people are willing to undertake serious
safety risks as part of their employment. Examples include high-rise con-
struction workers, window washers, and police officers. Critics should also
realize that the stringency of present environmental regulations greatly re-
duces the prevalence of health risks typically associated with permitted indus-
trial and waste facilities. Under current regulations, 'the risk of developing
cancer from living for seventy years at the fence line of a properly constructed
waste-to-energy plant is estimated to be one in a million.53 This risk is
equivalent to the odds of getting cancer from drinking one can of beer every
eight years.54 Moreover, the economic benefits of living near an industrial
plant often yield health benefits that far outweigh the minute risks that the
facility imposes.
In essence, environmental justice concerns rest on two distinct premises:
(1) that a few individuals (i.e., the neighbors of a polluting or waste facility)
are forced to bear the external costs of industrial processes from which the
public at large receives benefits; and (2) that a disproportionate percentage of
these individuals are minority or low-income citizens. Policies that simply
inject racial and socioeconomic considerations into siting and permitting pro-
cedures address the latter concern, but not the former. These "solutions" seek
to guarantee that the few individuals who are adversely affected are not mi-
nority or poor residents. Such measures, however, do nothing to alleviate the
first concern-the fact that a few citizens must disproportionately bear the
costs of processes that benefit everyone.
A compensation-based approach would remedy this fundamental injus-
tice by shifting the burden of external costs from the few neighbors of indus-
trial plants to all the individuals who share the benefits of those facilities-a
51. See, e.g., TOM TIE7ENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 51-59
(3d ed. 1992).
52. See, e.g., Luther J. Carter, The Mescarlero Option: Storage of Nuclear Waste at Mescalero
Apache Tribe Reservation in New Mexico, 50 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 11 (1994); Texas
County Tempted by Financial Rewards of Dumps, in ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (National Public Radio,
Transcript No. 1428-6, Mar. 21, 1994).
53. CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & KENNETH CHILTON, WHO IS "RESPONSIBLE" FOR GARBAGE? 13
(Center for the Study of American Business, Occasional Paper No. 140, 1994).
54. Id.
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process economists refer to as internalizing external costs. Under such an ap-
proach, facility owners view the adverse local impacts of their plant as part of
their operating costs, charge prices sufficiently high to cover these costs, and
use the added revenue to compensate local residents. 55 As a result, pollution
costs are no longer borne solely by those outside of the production process,
but are equitably distributed among those using the facility's services.
If the offsetting benefits are of a continuing nature-the provision of
parks, better schools or roads, or enhanced medical care, for example-the
plant's neighbors have far less motivation to relocate. Hence, a compensation
approach is just since no group of individuals, regardless of race and income
status, is bearing an unfair share of industry's costs. By stabilizing property
values with offsetting benefits, a compensation approach is also able to pre-
vent the white flight that exacerbates environmental disparity.
3. Balances Economics and Environment
The third key advantage of a compensation approach is that it helps move
toward a socially optimal level of pollution and industrial activity. Reckless
polluting is obviously not in the best interest of society. Complete pollution
prevention, however, would entail the elimination of many socially valuable
products and processes. In most cases, phasing out particular products is more
costly to society than accepting and treating the pollution required to create,
those products. Since reckless polluting is undesirable and complete pollution
elimination is virtually impossible, decisionmakers must attempt to determine
the socially optimal level of pollution abatement.
56
As pollution is reduced, the incremental cost of reducing each unit of
pollution tends to rise and the incremental benefit associated with each unit of
reduction tends to fall. The optimal level of pollution reduction occurs at the
point at which the added cost of abating another unit of pollution equals the
added benefit derived from that unit of abatement. Eliminating pollutants be-
yond this point imposes costs on society greater than the costs of the pollution
removed.57 Negotiating compensation arrangements creates a process by
which developers and host communities internalize social costs that would
otherwise remain unaccounted for. As such, compensation arrangements en-
55. Presumably, the facility would be the only one of its type in the area, so that higher prices
would not motivate residents to stop using its services. This inelastic demand would ensure that increased
revenue from higher prices would not be offset by a decrease in demand for the facility's services.
56. See, e.g., JAMES Lis & KENNETH CHILTON, THE LIMrrs OF POLLUTION PREVENTION (Center
for the Study of American Business, Contemporary Issues Series No. 52, 1992).
57. Consider, for example, the increasing incremental costs and decreasing incremental benefits of
cleaning up the industrial effluent of paper factories. Between 1970 and 1978, it cost the pulp and paper
industry $3 billion to achieve a 95% reduction in its water effluents. To reach a 98% reduction level by
1984, a goal proposed by the EPA at the time, the industry would have had to spend an additional $4.8
billion. MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, BusINESs, GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 354 (2d. ed. 1981).
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able decision makers to increase the efficiency of pollution-reduction deci-
sions.
Consider, for example, hypothetical negotiations to site an incinerator.
Throughout the negotiation proceedings, the proposed host community gath-
ers information concerning the local impact of the incinerator's operations.
Using this information, it determines the compensation its citizens would
deem fair to host the facility. The developer must then decide whether to: (1)
accept the community's compensation demands; (2) implement additional
pollution abatement devices so as to reduce the level of pollution exposure
and the consequent compensation requirement; or (3) focus on an alternative
site. In some instances, the costs associated with siting a proposed project
may be so high as to make it unprofitable in any location. A compensation
approach helps weed out such ill-conceived industrial projects.5 In any case,
negotiating compensation agreements causes firms to fully internalize costs
that would otherwise be thrust upon a site's neighbors.
Critics of negotiated compensation often assert that host communities are
at a disadvantage in negotiations because they do not have adequate informa-
tion on the possible health risks and other costs a facility will impose. 9 This
problem of information asymmetry, however, can easily be overcome. As part
of the compensation offers they extend to host communities, developers fre-
quently provide money for these communities to hire professional consultants
to study the costs and benefits of the proposed facility.6° Concerned com-
munities can request such grants at the start of compensation negotiations. In
addition, wealthy environmental organizations, which are increasingly dem-
onstrating concern over environmental racism, could provide the resources
that low-income communities need to conduct risk analyses and feasibility
studies.6
1
4. Provides Local Benefits
Finally, a compensation approach can provide substantial economic
benefits to residents of poor communities, actually leaving them better off
than they would have been without an industrial plant in their neighborhood.
Consider, for example, the village of Robbins, Illinois. Like too many other
predominantly minority communities around the country, this town on Chi-
cago's South Side suffers from a variety of social and economic ills. The per
58. Some critics argue that a compensation-based approach allows communities to halt industrial
development by raising their minimum compensation demands to a level that is too high for developers to
pay. However, because potential host communities risk losing benefits if they require too much compen-
sation, they have an incentive not to inflate their compensation demands.
59. For a discussion of the problems associated with information asymmetry and potential solu-
tions, see MICHAEL O'HARE, FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1983).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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capita income in the town (just over $8,000 in 1990)62 ranks 262 out of 263
communities in the Chicago metropolitan area;63 almost one-quarter of the
town's families live below the poverty line. 64 Between 1980 and 1991, the
town's population fell 15% to 8,000.65 Robbins has no gas station, no bank,
no laundromat, and no restaurant that stays open later than 6 p.m. Even basic
police and fire protection operate at a bare minimum. Churches (thirty-four)
outnumber tax-paying businesses (twenty-six).66 With such obvious social
and economic problems, it is no wonder that the efforts of town leaders to en-
tice more "desirable" businesses to Robbins were without success.
Twelve years ago, the town's mayor and the board of trustees, recogniz-
ing South Chicago's need for a large capacity waste facility,67 announced that
Robbins was interested in hosting an incinerator. After months of negotia-
tions, the town secured $400 million in financing to fund the project.68 Resi-
dents of Robbins saw the economic boost that the incinerator would provide
as a first step to regaining economic viability and repairing the town's
crumbling infrastructure. After months of battling environmentalists who op-
posed the project, the persistence of Robbins' residents paid off. In 1994,
Reading Energy and village officials cleared the final hurdles to the incinera-
tor's construction.69
With the completion of the project still many months away, Robbins has
begun reaping a number of benefits. In late November 1994, Mayor Irene
Brodie received the first of several payments from the incinerator develop-
ers. 70 Among other things, this $800,000 disbursement will be used to replace
a thirty-year old firetruck (one of two currently owned by the village), heat the
police station, purchase a generator for the town's pump house so that resi-
dents no longer lose water pressure during power outages, and expand Rob-
bins' inadequate sewer system. Later payments will be used to further im-
prove the town's infrastructure and to establish a college scholarship program
for Robbins' high school graduates.
In addition to these direct payments, the incinerator project will provide
Robbins with increased employment opportunities and tax revenue. The proj-
ect promises to create 600 jobs during the construction phase and more than
eighty permanent positions. 71 Town representatives estimate that, once opera-
62. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS-ILLINOIS 20
(1993).
63. Bonnie Miller Rubin, Robbins Has Many Uses for Windfall, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 2, 1994, at
MSS 1.
64. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 62, at 20.
65. See Rubin, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Telephone Interview with Rudolph Bouie, Chairman, Robbins' Citizen's Advisory Committee
(Aug. 1, 1994).
68. See Rubin, supra note 63.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; Bouie, supra note 67.
Vol. 14:195, 1997
Environmental Inequity
tional, the incinerator will increase Robbins' tax base by a minimum of 63%
($2 million a year). It is hoped that with this added employment and tax reve-
nue will come new businesses and, in turn, more job opportunities. Already,
Sea Way National Bank, the largest black-owned bank in the nation, has
plans to open a branch in the town. But for the citizens of Robbins, a new
bank is just the beginning. The incinerator project has seemingly breathed
new life into this community. For the first time in years, the people of Rob-
bins have hope for their town's future.
The simple fact is that industrial plants can provide economically disad-
vantaged communities with benefits that far outweigh the costs that the fa-
cilities impose on local residents. Consider, as another example, the advan-
tages residents of Sumter County, Alabama have reaped from the
controversial Emelle landfill. Because Sumter County residents are poor and
predominantly African-American, outside observers often refer to the Emelle
landfill as a prime example of environmental injustice.72 In actuality, Emelle
ended up in Sumter County because of the area's sparse population, arid cli-
mate, and location atop the Selma chalk formation-700 feet of dense, natu-
ral chalk. These factors, along with millions of dollars of state-of-the-art tech-
nology, make Emelle one of the world's safest landfills.
73
Furthermore, the landfill provides over 400 jobs (60% of which are held
by county residents), a $10 million annual payroll, and a guaranteed $4.2
million in annual tax revenue.74 This money has enabled the community to
build a fire station and a town hall, improve schools, upgrade the health-care
delivery system, and begin reversing rates of illiteracy and infant mortality.
Not surprisingly in light of these economic benefits, African-American
officials in Sumter County are apparently quite happy hosting the landfill.
The county commission has opposed state proposals that would have reduced
the amount of waste that the Emelle landfill accepts. "Financially, the land-
fill's been positive, very positive for the county," states Robert Smith, an Af-
rican-American elementary school principal who now chairs the county
commission. 5
While it is clear that industrial facilities that provide compensating
benefits to their neighbors can improve the quality of life in the community,
some may charge that it is immoral to pay individuals to expose themselves to
health risks. As mentioned above, this criticism ignores two important points.
First, it is important to keep in mind the regulatory environment in which
compensation agreements are negotiated. Current environmental standards are
designed to guarantee a base level of health protection in which the exposure
72. A Place at the Table, SIERRA, May-June 1993, at 52; Robert Bullard, The Threat of Envi-
ronmental Racism, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, winter 1993, at 25.
73. Charles McDermott, Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
689, 697 (1994).
74. Id.; Tom Arrandale, When the Poor Cry NIMBY, GOVERNING, Sept. 1993, at 40.
75. Arrandale, supra note 74, at 40.
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risks associated with polluting and waste facilities are minor. Consider, for
example, the theoretical risks that the Robbins incinerator will impose. Ac-
cording to Dr. William Hallenbeck, a University of Illinois environmental
health specialist who assessed the Robbins project, the risks associated with
living near the proposed incinerator for a lifetime are comparable to the risks
of such activities as living in a brick house for two months, having one chest
X-ray, or traveling ten miles by bicycle.7
6
Many environmental justice advocates discount such risk analyses. In-
stead, they recite anecdotes of high disease mortality rates (especially cancer
mortality rates) around industrial facilities.77 Yet in careful studies of even the
worst areas, such as Louisiana's so-called "Cancer 'Alley" south of Baton
Rouge, cancer incidence rates have been shown to be normal, or even below
national averages. Only the cancer death rate is high, indicating that a lack of
timely medical attention-not environmental contamination-is the root of
the problem. Consider the findings, summarized in a report to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, of a study conducted by the Louisiana State
University Medical Center:
[I]n contrast to the State's well-documented high cancer mortality
rates, incidence rates for all cancers combined in south Louisiana are
either the same as, or lower than, the national rates. According to the
1991 report, south Louisianans have a lower risk of developing the
most common cancers, with one exception-lung cancer in white
men. The study points to smoking as being primarily responsible
(90%) for the high incidence and mortality of lung cancer among
males, both black and white, in south Louisiana. For cancers other
than lung, the report says that the major problem appears to be a
lack of early detection and limited access to needed health care.78
These findings in "Cancer Alley" highlight the second difficulty with the
contention that compensating individuals for accepting industrial facilities
forces them to sacrifice their health: The deleterious health effects of poverty
and unemployment can far outweigh the health hazards from the facility it-
self. Agreeing to host an industrial facility in exchange for compensating
benefits can improve a community's public health by enabling residents to
76. Daniel John Sobieski, Burning Fears, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 7, 1993, at 20.
77. Consider, for example, the congressional testimony of activist Pat Bryant of the Gulf Coast
Tenants Association: "Cancer Alley remains one of the most poisoned areas anyplace .... Despite deni-
als of petrochemical industry financed studies, we know that cancer incidence in this corridor is higher
than the national average. Cancer is so commonplace that almost every family is touched." Environ-
mental Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 9, 10 (1993).
78. LOUISIANA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BATrLE FOR




combat such economically based health problems as inadequate nutrition and
inaccessible health care.
Since the Emelle landfill was built in 1977, economic growth in Sumter
County, Alabama has brought about improved health care and led to a decline
in infant mortality rates. For the years 1975-1977, Sumter County's infant
mortality rate was twenty-seven deaths per thousand, while the overall state
average was 18.8 per thousand. For the years 1985-87, the rate in Sumter
County had fallen to 14.4 per thousand, while Alabama's was 12.7 per thou-
sand. By 1991, when the state infant mortality rate stood at 11.4 per thou-
sand, Sumter County's had fallen to 8.5 per thousand.79 Such an impressive
gain in public health casts doubt on the notion that a compensation approach
requires communities to sacrifice health for economic gain.
Negotiated compensation agreements can substantially improve the qual-
ity of life in low-income areas. Environmental justice advocates, however,
have typically not supported a compensation approach, arguing instead for
restrictions on industrial development in poor and minority areas.80 In some
cases, environmental justice concerns have actually been used to stop devel-
opments that would have benefited both the developer and the host commu-
nity.81 Individuals truly interested in helping impoverished communities
should encourage win-win compensation agreements.
79. McDermott, supra note 73, at 698.
80. For a discussion of the concerns that environmental justice advocates typically raise with re-
spect to compensation programs, see Been, supra note 28, at 1040-46. The emphasis environmental jus-
tice advocates place on siting issues can be seen in their public statements before Congress, see supra
note 77, as well as in the environmental justice legislation that has been introduced at both the state and
federal levels. See, e.g., legislation cited supra notes 4, 5, 6 & 9 and accompanying text
81. Consider, for example, Brooksville, Mississippi. Federated Technologies Industries (FT1) of
Mississippi offered a compensation package to this small, predominantly African-American town in ex-
change for permission to site an incinerator and hazardous waste landfill. The company agreed to pay
$250,000 every year into the county's general revenue fund and $50,000 a year for roadway construction
and maintenance. FTI also agreed to build a civic center, to finance a research center, and to allot be-
tween 70 and 80% of the proposed facility's jobs to local residents, at starting wages of at least $7.00 an
hour. The response: the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) actively lobbied for the plant's approval. The plant was opposed by three local groups claiming
"environmental racism": an environmental organization (Protect the Environment of Noxubee County); a
group of middle-class black educators and ministers (African-Americans for Environmental Justice); and
a group of local business owners, most of whom paid employees minimum wage or slightly above. See
Keith Schneider, Blacks Fighting Blacks on Plan for Dump Site, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at A12;
Telephone Interview with Richard Brooks, Alderman of Brooksville, Miss. and President of the local
NAACP (Dec. 14, 1993). The local NAACP argued that these individuals were trying to prevent a new
employer from altering the area's low wage scale, thus keeping poor blacks "socially and economically
oppressed." Schneider, supra. See also New Mexico Asks Clinton to Block Effort to Develop Private
MRS, INsIDE ENERGY, June 6, 1994, at 3 (noting how environmental justice concerns, among other
things, motivated New Mexico Governor Bruce King to seek moratorium on actions furthering the Mes-
calero Indians' attempt to host temporary nuclear waste facility).
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C. Encouraging Compensation Negotiations
There are a variety of methods that can be employed to encourage com-
pensation negotiations between developers and the residents of potential host
communities. Three specific types of approaches will be examined below: (1)
voluntary approaches such as those already being used by many companies
and host communities; (2) a common law approach that requires returning to
a legal paradigm that emphasizes the rights-based doctrines of nuisance, tres-
pass, and strict liability; (3) statutory approaches that require legislation by
state or local governing bodies.
1. Voluntary Approach.
Policymakers may find that no changes in the political economy are nec-
essary to encourage negotiated compensation. In recent years, voluntary com-
pensation has replaced the traditional siting process as the preferred method
of locating industrial and waste facilities.
Traditionally, developers sited their plants using what may be termed the
"DAD" paradigm: decide, announce, and defend. Developers decided the best
location for their facility, took out options on the land, announced to the po-
litical leaders of the community their intention to site, and then defended their
decision from attacks by local opposition groups. Increasingly, however, pri-
vate developers are finding that negotiating compensation agreements with
potential host communities offers a more efficient siting process and better
long-term community relations. 82 Dissatisfied local citizens represent a threat
to expedient issuance of state and local permits and can disrupt construction
or operation of waste management facilities. In short, it pays to be a good
neighbor.
Browning Ferris Industries (BFI) certainly prefers negotiated compensa-
tion over the DAD paradigm. According to BFI Chief Executive Officer and
two-time EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus, BFI's policy in recent
years has been to provide host fees whenever siting new waste facilities. Mr.
Ruckelshaus notes that, while the company is not typically required by any
statute to negotiate compensation agreements, BFI has found that such an ap-
proach speeds up the siting process and improves community relations in the
long run. Often, the company approaches community leaders (not necessarily
public officials) with the suggestion, "let's look for a site together." In Ruck-
elshaus' s view, the key to getting the community "on your side" is "choice"-
being involved in the siting process. 83
82. See, e.g., Herbert Inhaber, Of LULU's, NIMBYs, and NIMTOOs, 107 PUB. INTEREST 52
(1992); Michael O'Hare, "Not on My Block You Don't": Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of
Compensation, 25 PUB. POL'Y 407 (1977).
83. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, CEO, Browning Ferris Industries (Apr. 28, 1995).
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BFI's experience indicates that the current political economy may already
be producing voluntary solutions to alleged environmental injustice. Never-
theless, policymakers may believe that the politics of the situation demand a
more direct approach. To some, the question is: How can the legal/regulatory
environment encourage industrial developers to negotiate compensation
packages with their neighbors?
2. Common Law Approach
Perhaps the most fundamental way to encourage compensation would be
to return to a common law system of environmental regulation. Prior to the
passage of the major federal environmental statutes in the 1960s and 1970s,
environmental pollution was primarily regulated through such common law
doctrines as nuisance, trespass, and strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities.84 These and similar doctrines are grounded in the premise that in-
dividuals cannot legitimately use their property in any way that harms or de-
values their neighbors' property.
85
Under the common law approach to environmental protection, plaintiffs
who could demonstrate that their property rights were legitimately violated in
some way could receive judicial remedies ranging from an order enjoining the
defendant's operation to the imposition of monetary damages. Grounding
environmental protection in the property rights of others ensured that no one
could get away with harming his neighbors' property-even if the neighbors
were poor or the polluting activity was otherwise legal and socially benefi-
cial.8
6
84. A "private nuisance" is defined as a substantial and unreasonable interference (either inten-
tional or reckless) with the use and enjoyment of an interest in an individual's land. See, e.g., Ryan v. City
of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Iowa 1942); Lederman v. Cunningham, 283 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955).
The tort of "trespass" is defined as an unlawful interference with one's person, property or rights.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990).
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities may also be understood in terms of property
rights. The theory behind this doctrine is generally credited to Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R. 330 (H.L.
1868). In this case, a mill owner in a coal mining area constructed a water reservoir upon his property.
The water burst through the filled-up shafts of abandoned mines and flowed into adjoining mines, causing
damage. Justice Blackburn stated, "We think that the rule of law is that a person who for his own pur-
poses brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must
keep it at his peril, and if he does not do so, is primafacie answerable for all damage which is the natural
consequences of its escape." Id. Under this rule, an individual conducting dangerous activities on his
property is accountable for damage he inflicts on his neighbor's property.
85. The ancient common law maxim sec utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or "one is so to use his
own as not to injure another's property," underlies these common law doctrines. For an example of the
explicit application of the maxim in a modem pollution case, see International Paper Co. v. Maddox, 203
F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1953).
86. In Hurlbut v. McKone. for example, the court enjoined a nuisance-creating lumber operation,
even though the business was per se lawful, and the factory's neighbors were themselves tradesmen used
to industrial activity. 10 A. 164 (Conn. 1887). In reaching this conclusion, the Hurlbut Court quoted with
approval the opinion of an early New Jersey Equity Court:
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If developers are liable to have their activities enjoined if they violate
their neighbors' property rights, they will be much more likely to consider be-
forehand the effects of their actions and obtain, in exchange for providing
compensating benefits, the neighbors' permission to operate. Put simply, the
threat of injunction (and/or having to pay damages for devaluing neighboring
property) encourages voluntary compensation agreements.87
Compared to the common law approach to environmental regulation, the
current statutory system is less likely to encourage developers to negotiate
voluntarily compensation agreements. The present environmental regulatory
paradigm is often referred to as a command and control system.88 Under such
a paradigm, legislators command a standard of environmental cleanliness
(e.g., the Clean Water Act's "fishable/swimmable" standard for water qual-
ity89) or a level of technology to be used (e.g., the Clean Water Act's reference
to "Best Practicable Control Technology"90) and delegate authority to bu-
reaucracies to control the activities of individual polluters in order to meet
this standard. Bureaucrats typically control polluting activities by issuing op-
erating permits.
I find no authority that will warrant the position that the part of town which is occupied by
tradesmen and mechanics for residences and carrying on trades and business, and which
contains no elegant or costly dwellings, and is not inhabited by the wealthy and luxurious, is
a proper or convenient place for carrying on business which renders the dwellings there un-
comfortable to the owners and their families . . . . There is no principle in law or reason
which would give protection to the large comforts and enjoyments with which the wealthy
and luxurious are surrounded, and fail to secure to the artisan and laborer and their families
the fewer and more restricted comforts which they enjoy.
Hurlbut, 10 A. at 167 (quoting Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294 (1835))
See also Whalen v. Union Bag Co., 101 N.E. 805, 806 (N.Y. 1913) ("Although the damage to
plaintiff may be slight as compared to the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good
reason for refusing an injunction. Neither courts of equity nor law can be guided by such a rule, for if
followed to its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of his little property by giving it to
those already rich."); Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 118 P. 928, 933 (Cal. 1911) ("If the
smaller interest must yield to the larger, all small property rights ... would soon be absorbed by the large,
more powerful few ... ").
87. Under the common law, developers were certainly expected to know their neighbors' property
rights and be accountable for how their actions affected those rights. In Whalen, 101 N.E. at 806, for ex-
ample, the Court pointed out that
[b]efore locating the plant the owners were bound to know that every riparian proprietor is
entitled to have the waters of the stream that washes his land come to it without obstruction,
diversion, or corruption, subject only to the reasonable use of the water, by those similarly
entitled, for such domestic purposes as are inseparable from and necessary for the free use
of their land; they were bound also to know the character of their proposed business ... and
to determine for themselves at their own peril whether they should be able to conduct their
business upon a stream.., without injury to their neighbors.
To avoid litigation, the mill owners could have contracted for riparian rights from downstream land own-
ers-a de facto compensation agreement. See Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Constitutional Choice
for the Control of Water Pollution, 3 CoNsT. POL. ECON. 359, 363 (1992).
88. See, e.g., O'HARE, supra note 59; Inhaber, supra note 82.
89. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)- (2) (1994).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(A) (1994).
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In a command and control system, a polluter operating within permit
guidelines is in the clear; it is the permit-not the neighbors' rights-that
limits a polluter's actions. The case of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois illustrates
how environmental statutes take the focus of environmental protection off
property rights.91 In this 1981 case, the Supreme Court ruled that because the
EPA had granted the City of Milwaukee a permit under the Clean Water Act,
the city could dump its sewage into Lake Michigan-Chicago's water sup-
ply.92 This decision overturned the Court's earlier ruling in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, a case decided before the passage of the Clean Water Act, in
which the Court held that Milwaukee's dumping was a nuisance to Illinois
and must be stopped.93
To the extent that environmental statutes have not formally displaced the
common law, they have certainly weakened it. A nearly insurmountable de-
fense for any firm charged with creating a nuisance is that the firm is in
compliance with all required permits. In contrast, the common law's ground-
ing of environmental protection in rights rather than in legislative fiat guaran-
teed that a developer's permit could not enable him to ignore the effects of his
activities on his neighbors. In Hurlbut v. McKone, for example, a lawful but
nuisance-creating lumber operation was enjoined from practices that made its
neighbors "uncomfortable." The Court stated:
[I]t is suggested that the defendants' business was per se lawful, and
the use made of their own property was reasonable. We concede that
the law will not interfere with a use that is reasonable. But the ques-
tion of reasonable use is to be determined in view of the rights of
others.
94
To the extent that the current environmental statutory paradigm encour-
ages developers to focus solely on meeting the demands of their permits,
rather than on mitigating the effects that their activities have on their neigh-
bors, the command and control system exacerbates environmental injustice.
Returning to a common law system of environmental litigation using rights-
based doctrines of nuisance, trespass, and strict liability for abnormally dan-
gerous activities would encourage developers to negotiate the compensation
agreements that are the key to securing environmental justice in the long run.
91. 451 U.S. 304(1981).
92. id. See also People v. New Mines, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1963) (holding that state Attorney
General's claim against corporation for acid mine drainage was precluded by statute establishing adminis-
trative bodies to address water pollution).
93. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
94. Hurlbut v. McKone, 10 A. 164, 165 (Conn. 1887) (emphasis added).
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3. Statutory Approach
A return to common law environmental protection may, however, be po-
litically unfeasible in the short term (or even the long term). An intermediate
solution between the status quo and a return to common law protection might
be flexible statutes designed to motivate widespread compensation agree-
ments. A brief examination of Wisconsin's landfill siting statute95 demon-
strates how legislators can encourage compensation negotiations without be-
coming too heavy handed.
Wisconsin's landfill negotiation/arbitration statute was adopted in 1981
with the intent of making the siting of waste facilities more efficient and ac-
commodating the legitimate concerns of local residents and municipalities.96
The principal mechanism by which the legislation accomplishes both of these
goals is the requirement that any developer wishing to site a landfill must first
negotiate with the affected municipalities upon their request.97 During these
negotiations, any subject is open for discussion "except the need for the facil-
ity" and any "proposal that would make the [developer's] responsibilities un-
der the approved feasibility report or plan of operation less stringent" than re-
quired by the Department of Natural Resources.98 In principle, negotiations
can continue until all of the parties' concerns are resolved. If a settlement has
not been reached after a "reasonable period," however, one or both of the
parties can request that the case be turned over to binding arbitration.
Thus far, the Wisconsin program seems to have worked rather well. One
measure of its success is the lack of sitings calling for arbitration. Since the
law took effect in 1982, only three of the 152 submitted permit applications
have been arbitrated.99 Officials with waste management organizations appear
to be satisfied with the landfill arbitration/negotiation statute. According to
Joe Suchechi, manager of government affairs for WMX Technologies, Inc.,
requiring compensation negotiations makes it "much easier" to site and ex-
pand waste facilities in Wisconsin. 1°° In other states, developers and potential
host communities often become deadlocked, preferring to appeal to govern-
ment officials in a winner takes all political battle. By involving the local
95. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (West 1989).
96. § 144.445(2).
97. §§ 144.445(6),(7). Failure on the part of a developer to participate in negotiations will result
in the denial of necessary licenses and operating permits. 144.445(8)(e). On the other hand, if local com-
munities refuse to negotiate or negotiate in bad faith, a developer may petition the Waste Facility Siting
Board to be relieved of the negotiation requirement and proceed with the project via traditional regula-
tory channels. See Peter Ruud & Dean Werner, Wisconsin's Landfill Negotiation/Arbitration Statute,
Wis. B. BuLL., Nov. 1985, at 17-19, 64-65.
98. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.445(8)(a)(1),(2) (West 1989).
99. Telephone Conversation with Jane Furst, Program Assistant, State of Wisconsin Waste Facil-
ity Siting Board (Apr. 4, 1994).
100. Telephone Conversation with Joe Suchechi, manager of government affairs, WMX Tech-
nologies Inc. (Mar. 3, 1994).
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community and formalizing negotiation procedures, the Wisconsin law, states
Suchechi, creates a "process that gets everyone to the right place."
10 1
The virtue of the Wisconsin legislation is that it includes several princi-
ples that are necessary for successful compensation agreements. First, the
Wisconsin statute clearly specifies who is to negotiate with whom. Develop-
ers must notify a potential host community of their interest in siting in that
community, and, if the community wishes to negotiate, both parties are re-
quired to establish negotiating committees according to guidelines set forth in
the statute. 102Secondly, the legislation not only establishes the negotiation
process, but also ensures that the results of their negotiations will be legally
binding. The fulcrum of the legislation is its prohibition against constructing
or operating a new facility without a "siting agreement."' 1 3 This document re-
cords the conditions and compensation to be exacted by the community from
the developer, any voluntary commitments of the developer, as well as the
promises made by local government officials. Without such legally binding
authority, the parties have fewer incentives to negotiate in good faith. Finally,
the Wisconsin statute provides a back-up plan, providing for the arbitration of
siting decisions should negotiations fail or should one party refuse to cooper-
ate. 1° 4 Each of these criteria is crucial if negotiated compensation agreements
are to be effective in addressing environmental justice concerns.
Conclusion
As the environmental justice movement is transformed from a predomi-
nantly grassroots force into an insider in the environmental policy arena, ad-
vocates should endeavor to keep sight of their ultimate goal of eliminating
environmental injustice. Achieving this objective requires an understanding
of the processes creating environmental inequity. Data from Houston and the
St. Louis area indicate that observed environmental disparities are, at least to
a significant extent, motivated by economics: industrial and waste plants have
a propensity to impose costs on their neighbors, thereby lowering property
values and attracting poorer individuals to the neighborhood. Since economic
forces, rather than discriminatory siting and permitting decisions, underlie
most instances of environmental disparity, a workable policy solution should
be based on economics.
Compensating individuals for the costs that industrial facilities impose
upon them directly addresses these economic forces. When a facility offers its
neighbors sufficient offsetting benefits, the neighbors will be less likely to
101. Id.
102. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.445(6) - (7) (West 1989).
103. § 144.445(9).
104. § 144.445(10)(a-b).
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view its presence as a liability to the community, and fewer families will relo-
cate. Moreover, a compensation approach promotes justice and efficiency and
can provide economic revitalization to impoverished communities. Advocates
in the environmental justice movement would do the most justice by recogniz-
ing the economic factors underlying environmental disparities and embracing





INDEPENDENT SAMPLE T-TEST FOR A DIFFERENCE OF
MEANS AND TWO-SAMPLE WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS
FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION.
1970 CENSUS TRACTS / TSDFs, LANDFILLS & INCINERATORS
ONLY
TRACT MEAN CASES T WILCOXON
VARIABLE PLANT I OTHER PLANT OTHER TEST Z-STATISTIC
MDHV 12,685 16,614 19 334 2.00** -2.3043**
WORK 93.7418 95.0531 21 359 1.45 -1.0005
POV 10.4872 12.2276 21 359 0.64 -0.2034
MINOR 7.1619 17.9621 21 359 1.55 -0.3928
PCTEDU 24.3616 25.9035 21 359 0.62 -0.9392
PCTMANF 11.9114 10.4587 21 359 -1.89* -2.5396**
* p<0.10
** p < 0.05
p < 0 .0 1
MDHV = Median Housing Values
WORK = Percentage of Male Residents Employed in the Labor Force
POV = Percentage of Residents Below the Poverty Line
MINOR = Percentage of Nonwhite Residents
PCTEDU = Percentage of Residents with a High School Education or Higher
PCTMANF = Percentage of Residents Employed in Manufacturing
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Table lb
INDEPENDENT-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR A DIFFERENCE OF
MEANS AND TWO-SAMPLE WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS
FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION.
1980 CENSUS TRACTS / TSDFs, LANDFILLS & INCINERATORS
ONLY
TRACT MEAN CASES T WILCOXON
VARIABLE PLANT OTHER PLANT OTHER TEST Z-STATISTIC
MDHV 39,204 40,504 42 329 0.31 -0.8029
WORK 91.3476 90.2255 42 330 -0.98 -0.3131
POV 91.3476 90.2255 42 330 -0.98 -0.3131
MINOR 15.6076 26.7039 42 332 1.92* -0.4098
PCTEDU 35.0164 37.2376 42 331 1.12 -1.3172
PCTMANF 10.3876 9.2927 42 332 -2.08** -2.1875*
* p<0.10
** p < 0 .0 5
p < 0 .0 1
MDHV = Median Housing Values
WORK = Percentage of Male Residents Employed in the Labor Force
POV = Percentage of Residents Below the Poverty Line
MINOR = Percentage of Nonwhite Residents
PCTEDU = Percentage of Residents with a High School Education or Higher




INDEPENDENT-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR A DIFFERENCE OF
MEANS AND TWO-SAMPLE WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS
FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION.
1990 CENSUS TRACTS / TSDFs, LANDFILLS & INCINERATORS
ONLY
TRACT MEAN CASES T WILCOXON
VARIABLE PLANT OTHER PLANT OTHER TEST Z-STATISTIC
MDHV 63,163 68,395 52 327 0.68 -1.2892
WORK 91.5618 89.6081 49 324 -1.24 -0.5736
POV 14.8867 15.8891 49 324 0.41 -0.0348
MINOR 22.8303 30.7280 50 325 1.44 -0.5297
PCTEDU 46.0836 47.8853 50 325 0.94 -1.2403
PCTMANF 8.2045 7.5250 50 325 -1.45 -1.8001*
* p<0.10
** p < 0.05
p <0.01
MDHV = Median Housing Values
WORK = Percentage of Male Residents Employed in the Labor Force
POV = Percentage of Residents Below the Poverty Line
MINOR = Percentage of Nonwhite Residents
PCTEDU = Percentage of Residents with a High School Education or Higher
PCTMANF = Percentage of Residents Employed in Manufacturing
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Table 2a
* p< 0 .10









Percentage of Male Residents Employed in the Labor Force
Percentage of Residents Below the Poverty Line
Percentage of Nonwhite Residents
Percentage of Residents with a High School Education or Higher
Percentage of Residents Employed in Manufacturing
INDEPENDENT-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR A DIFFERENCE OF
MEANS AND TWO-SAMPLE WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS
FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION.
1970 CENSUS TRACTS / ALL FACILITIES
TRACT MEAN CASES T WILCOXON
VARIABLE PLANT OTHER PLANT OTHER TEST Z-STATISTIC
MDHV 15,132 16,788 83 280 1.59 -2.8763***
WORK 94.3424 95.1845 92 288 1.75* -1.5166
POV 13.8305 11.5886 92 288 -1.56 -1.6687*
MINOR 17.7516 17.2418 92 288 -0.14 -2.2665**
PCTEDU 23.5138 26.5544 92 288 2.33** -2.6052***




INDEPENDENT-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR A DIFFERENCE OF
MEANS AND TWO-SAMPLE WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS
FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION.
1980 CENSUS TRACTS / ALL FACILITIES
TRACT MEAN CASES T WILCOXON
VARIABLE PLANT OTHER PLANT I OTHER TEST Z-STATISTIC
MDHV 37,445 41,209 84 287 1.20 -2.7427***
WORK 89.5762 90.5820 85 287 1.17 -1.1415
POV 16.4234 12.7500 85 287 -2.12** -2.4420**
MINOR 26.5301 25.1424 85 289 -0.32 -2.1457**
PCTEDU 34.9055 37.6020 85 288 1.80* -2.0951"
PCTMANF 9.6980 9.3326 85 289 -0.92 -0.8840
* p<0.10
** p < 0 .0 5
p < 0 .0 1
MDHV = Median Housing Values
WORK = Percentage of Male Residents Employed in the Labor Force
POV = Percentage of Residents Below the Poverty Line
MINOR = Percentage of Nonwhite Residents
PCTEDU = Percentage of Residents with a High School Education or Higher
PCTMANF = Percentage of Residents Employed in Manufacturing
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Table 2c
* p< 0 .10
** p < 0 .0 5







= Median Housing Values
= Percentage of Male Residents Employed in the Labor Force
= Percentage of Residents Below the Poverty Line
= Percentage of Nonwhite Residents
= Percentage of Residents with a High School Education or Higher
= Percentage of Residents Employed in Manufacturing
INDEPENDENT-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR A DIFFERENCE OF
MEANS AND TWO-SAMPLE WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS FOR
EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION.
1990 CENSUS TRACTS / ALL FACILITIES
TRACT MEAN CASES T WILCOXON
VARIABLE PLANT OTHER PLANT OTHER TEST Z-STATISTIC
MDHV 63,117 69,118 91 288 0.97 -2.2460**
WORK 89.0247 90.1242 88 285 0.88 -0.5723
POV 18.2934 14.9744 88 285 -1.71* -1.7130*
MINOR 32.0284 28.9426 89 286 -0.71 -1.8084*
PCTEDU 46.1298 48.1167 89 286 1.30 -1.4848
PCTMANF 8.0259 7.4879 89 286 -1.44 -1.3913
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